The Language of Ideology: 
Lingual Manipulation of Readers in German 
Literature of the Third Reich

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In recognizing more than just hyperbole in their critical studies of National Socialist language, post-war philologists Viktor Klemperer (1946) and Eugen Seidel (1961) credit persuasive words and syntax with the expansion of Hitler's ideology among the German people. This popular explanation is being revisited by contemporary philologists, however, as new historical argument holds the functioning of the Third Reich to be anything but monolithic. An emerging scholarly consensus on the presence of more chaos than coherence in Nazi discourse suggests a new imperative for research. After reviewing the foundational works of Mein Kampf (1925) and Myth of the Twentieth Century (1930), the author confirms Klemperer and Seidel's claim for linguistic manipulation in the rise of the National Socialist Party. Most importantly, this article provides a detailed explanation of how party leaders employed rhetorical language to promote fascist ideology without an underlying basis of logical argumentation.

I. Introduction

In their respective post-war philological studies Lingua Tertii Imperii (1946) and Sprachwandel im Dritten Reich (1961), Viktor Klemperer and Eugen Seidel view National Socialism’s language as others might view its government. The authors view Nazi language, in other words, as following a course like that of Nazi Germany itself: as beginning with insidious effects, then ending in monolithic control. According to this bold argument, an increasingly-prevalent line of Nazi propaganda did not simply secure from the German public pervasive support for policy. Rather, this propaganda, whether literary or auditory, also witnessed fundamental alteration of language – alteration that made uniform a vocabulary, syntax, and hyperbole which embodied fascist ideology itself. Such stylistic innovation, Klemperer (1946) and Seidel (1961) argue, infiltrated all things lingual. Indeed, it infiltrated everyday German discourse so as to ensure that every citizen, willing or otherwise, eventually conformed in part, at least, to the platform of the state. And so the language unique to National Socialism functioned alongside the movement’s express political content to enable popular manipulation and attach Germans to a fascist ideology (Klemperer 1946, 10-77; Seidel 1961, vii).

Though their studies remain influential, Klemperer and Seidel have met with increased skepticism from subsequent generations of academia. Emboldened by historical research that attests to the execution and organization of the Third Reich as anything but consistent, critics now question the extent to which official language dictated that of the average German (Sauer 1978, 33). These critics have proven that adoption of Nazi propaganda was in some regions absent; they have also shown that alterations to the German language comprised the product of lingual movements well

1 The literal translation of the latter title is Alteration of Language in the Third Reich (1961).
underway before National Socialism’s birth. Such criticisms render Nazi language no monolith. They suggest its infiltration into the public consciousness was sporadic, even ineffective.

While accepting that the Third Reich’s language as well as its government functioned with limitation; while cognizant that Klemperer (1946) and Seidel (1961) are therefore overstated – one may dismiss as mistaken, even as apologetic the criticisms by Sauer (1978) and his contemporaries. The key to understanding the language of Nazi propaganda is not that the language extended at all times to all areas under German control, but that the language did, when reaching an audience consistently, produce in that audience a certain approval of and bond with fascist ideology. Hence this study will distance itself from Sauer (1978) to confirm, on a modest scale, the ultimate argument of Klemperer and Seidel: namely, that Nazi language employs a style from the literary devices of which the party ideology occurs to audiences. The article focuses on a few passages from two popular Nazi writings – Hitler’s Mein Kampf (1925) and Rosenberg’s Der Mythus des 20. Jahrhunderts (1930) respectively – to provide textual evidence for Klemperer and Seidel’s sketched, but in many cases unverified, points on the language’s technique.

First, the author will establish that each of these texts, in and around certain moments where its ideas alone might not suffice, surreptitiously employs language itself to convince those readers of an aspect of the party’s ideology; and second, that this lingual effect emerges through common techniques of diction and syntax. Notwithstanding the small breadth of this study, the article will support the notion that Nazi language, at least when under the control of its principal authors, is in fact that monolith, that sweeping infiltration of German value, which Klemperer and Seidel recognize it to be.

II. The Prefix

According to Klemperer (1946), Nazi rhetoric exhibits a clear will to the superlative. Whether in its statement of numerical figures, its citation of German devotion, or its portrayal of a foreign threat, this language seeks continually to heighten for audiences the significance of National Socialism’s movement. In so doing it enacts a party ideology that would transcend the politics of other nations, acting instead in a setting more essential and grand than any other in Western civilization. To achieve this effect, propagandists like Goebbels attach prefixes of size to those nouns which describe the German situation. Mundane political campaigns and days are rendered “Grossoffensive” [great-offensives] and “Grosskampftage” [great days of struggle] respectively; military actions of small consequence are depicted as “Vernichtungsschlachten” [annihilation-battles]; and “Juden und Bolschewisten” [Jews and Bolsheviks], entities whose ranks do not in the least outnumber Germans, are transformed into massive “Weltfeinde” [World-enemies] (Klemperer 1946, 282-283). Most insidious is this last maneuver, Klemperer (1946) notes, as it seeks to magnify for a German audience the purported threat represented by a Jewish or Bolshevik enemy—thus, inasmuch as it uses and reiterates a prefix like “Welt” [world] that it may turn diverse minorities into the unified, hegemonic group which Nazi ideology recognizes them to be.

In what confirms Klemperer’s argument, such a technique manifests itself during a chapter on finance in Rosenberg’s Der Mythus des 20. Jahrhunderts (1930). When formulating his argumentative justification for action against Jews, Rosenberg employs hyperbolic diction to heighten the power of purported Jewish capitalists. Theirs are not institutions but “Bankpalaeste” [bank-palaces]; theirs not mere financial success but “Geldherrschaft” [money-lordship] without rue (Rosenberg 1930, 670). Such hyperbole, however, constitutes no more than prelude to the effect that emerges from Rosenberg’s use of “Welt” as a superlative prefix. Through it he defines Germany’s enemy as

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2 The respective titles are My Struggle (1925) and The Myth of the Twentieth Century (1930).
striving not merely for national influence or financial success, but rather for a sort of ubiquitous infiltration:


Here Rosenberg – in precisely a moment at which his ideas of a global Jewish conspiracy, bereft of documented examples or even of a footnote for their support, have somehow to be verified for readers – allows the rhetoric of “Welt” to itself provide proof. That is, he allows this rhetoric to make concrete for readers the still-abstract Nazi ideology in which all Jewish concerns, whether small or large, aim at a comprehensive spread throughout the globe and thereby at the death of the German soul. Opposing to Germany a series of unnamed financial powers, Rosenberg’s attachment of the “Welt” prefix to Jewish “Banken” [banks], as well as to the “Verschuldung” [indebtedness] and “Herrschaft” [lordship] they supposedly engender, does more than simply overstate for German readers the power of their enemy. Attachment ensures syntactically that disparate factors – be they banks, German reparation-payment plans, or even Jews outside the financial sector and insofar as they all want to occupy the same total space of “Welt,” – act not separately but together towards one purpose: that is, towards complete extension and presence of their being. Indeed, Rosenberg steers his audience through this language both to see disparate acts as being of a Jewish conspiracy and to see the Jew himself as wanting to infiltrate not just Germany, but literally everything. Hence because of their connected “Welt”-status, the goal and acts of large financial institutions, along with those of the Jew to whom Rosenberg has linked them, take on a sort mythic proportion. And this very proportion, since it belies firm distinction of its parts, now renders irrational conflations by Nazi ideology, otherwise hindered by a need to distinguish among foreign groups, plausible. All banks may now be political leviathans; all Jews financial agents; and all German indebtedness the product of Jewish drive towards total control. The philosopher’s language has itself enacted Nazi ideology: has itself enacted the notion of a German people surrounded by the endless forces of Jewish conspiracy and thence forced to defend themselves. German conflict and foreign enemy now operate on that grand, globally crucial scale in which National Socialist theory wishes an audience to locate their movement. While Rosenberg’s explicit argumentation may fail to substantiate National Socialist ideology, his employment of the superlative “Welt”-prefix has done just that.

In his Mein Kampf (1925), Hitler makes use of this same technique. Much like Rosenberg (1930), he finds himself lacking historical example or citation at crucial points of argumentation, though this lack of information proves no obstacle. During these points, he affects to readers his party’s ideological components through a superlative description, particularly the “Welt”-prefix:

Die Gedankengaenge des Judentums dabei sind klar. Die Bolschewisierung Deutschlands, das heisst die Ausrottung der nationalen voelkischen deutschen Intelligenz und die dadurch ermoeglichte Auspressung der deutschen Arbeitskraft im Joche der juedischen Weltfinanz, ist

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3 “The honorless [Jewish] money-lordship must strive for world-lordship that is forced on the basis of world-indebtedness.” But a racial-organic cut-off across the globe would also mean, in a similarly forced way: “Das ironische Anfuehrungszeichen [in der LTI des Nationalsozialismus] beschränkt sich nicht auf neutrales Zitieren, sondern setzt Zweifel in die Wahrheit des Zitierten, erklärt von sich aus den mitgeteilten Ausspruch fuer Luege” (Klemperer 97). “The end of Jewish messianism as it has nearly realized itself in the form of the world-banks.”
Attachment of “Welt” as a prefix to finance again elevates to mythic proportion the power of a small minority. But this attachment does even more. It conflates disparate actors, be they Jewish capitalists, Bolsheviks, or simply Jewish individuals. For if Jewish “Weltfinanz” [world-finance] is in fact to inhabit that total financial space which its prefix denotes, then it encompasses every capitalist, indeed every materialist member of the financial system – encompasses, in other words, all those parties whom Nazi ideology renders as in league so far as their un-German world-view and antagonism towards the German people are concerned. Thus the groups are linked for readers, and therefore seen as driving together towards total, world presence--as working cohesively towards an infiltration of all parts and peoples. So readers receive Germany’s enemies as Nazi ideology would have them: namely, as of a linked, conspiratorial course that threatens in its own ubiquity to quell any firm distinction among peoples.

That this disappearance of distinction is one strived for by Jews, Hitler (1925) can of course not prove logically. His superlative language, however, substantiates the notion lingually in the form of a “juedische Welteroberungstendenz” [Jewish world-conquest-tendency]. Indeed, this term effects a Jewish group whose tendency to continued spread knows no bounds save that of the world itself--meaning Jews, and all those disparate groups to whom they have been linked, belie not only the German nation, but any sort of firm identity other than their own. Thus the Jew comes to inhabit through language the role which Nazi ideology accords him: that of an international vagabond, contrary to particular or local roots, who operates in a manner antagonistic towards all national values. As in other moments at which his argument requires a proof he cannot logically provide, Hitler (1925) has allowed language itself to erect fascist ideology. And so does Klemperer’s (1946) local claim about Nazi employment of the superlative, as well as that universal argument about Nazi language which he shares with Seidel (1961), prove valid.

III. Ironic Quotation

Among the lingual techniques that Klemperer (1946) identifies as intrinsic to National Socialism is a perverse use of quotation. Whereas quotations in writing ordinarily relay to readers an exact statement from a source, they serve for authors of the Third Reich a distinctly other function: one in which the authors, by placing a word or phrase in quotation marks without any documentation, ironically deride those to whom that word or phrase is attributed. In this manner do party propagandists deem Roosevelt and Churchill “Staatsmaenner” [statesmen], Einstein a “Forscher” [researcher], and Soviet officers “rote” [red] Offiziere (Klemperer 1946, 97). Such a verbal device for irony is, of course, neither new nor confined to the era of fascist politics. But what distinguishes its role in Nazi language is that it appears far more than do regular quotations, and that it frequently passes mere mocking to produce for German audiences a fundamental destabilization of the quoted object and its meaning.

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4 “The thought-processes of Jewry are thereby clear. The Bolshevisation of Germany – that is, the extermination of the national folkish German intelligence and thus enablement of extortion of German manpower under the joke of Jewish world-finance – is only conceived as prelude to the further extension of the Jewish world-conquest-tendency.”

5 “Das ironische Anfuhrungszeichen [in der LTI des Nationalsozialismus] beschränkt sich nicht auf neutrales Zitieren, sondern setzt Zweifel in die Wahrheit des Zitierten, erklärt von sich aus den mitgeteilten Ausspruch fuer Luge” (Klemperer 1946, 97).
As it manifests in Hitler’s *Mein Kampf* (1925), this device confirms and makes vivid Klemperer’s sketch about Nazi quotation; it meanwhile corroborates Klemperer’s shared claim with Seidel regarding the universal, ideology-enacting effect of Nazi language. Throughout *Mein Kampf* (1925), ironic quotations made by Hitler function as a conduit through which he may channel ideology to German readers in precisely those moments at which argumentative proof is lacking. Rather than systematically critiquing policy by his democratic political opponents during the Weimar era, for instance, Hitler fashions language to undermine their “Demokratie” [democracy]; to dismiss the “reden” [discussing] and “verhandeln” [negotiating] they purport to be acting (Hitler 1925, 115-123). While this technique appears obvious, a subtlety to its effect – one that, as will be shown, generates readers’ acceptance of Nazi ideology vicariously through their acceptance of certain language – emerges in Hitler’s discussion of a proposed development of peace through international economy:


When writing of “‘wirtschaftsfriedliche’ Eroberung” [financially-peaceful conquest], Hitler (1925) does not employ quotation for the purpose of citation; no footnotes are given, no authors mentioned, no context documented. Rather, he employs quotation marks to an ironic end that sees more than mocking. For, with this quotation and its accompanying syntax, Hitler argues before his audience not simply against certain politicians and financial actors who have failed to measure up to the principles behind an economic peace. What he ultimately attacks through this quotation—that is, what he lingually positions to readers as in doubt—is not so much the success of any efforts at international economy as the concept of economic peace itself. To wit, Hitler accepts and argues the existence of conquest through finance; but he questions specifically the notion of “wirtschaftsfriedlich” [financially peaceful] inasmuch as he places it alone in quotation marks. He in so doing indicates that this latter concept does not exist as advertised or intended—thereby meaning to readers, quite directly, that though financial conquest is a reality, yet peaceful behavior mixed with economic expansion is an illusion.

By having thus enclosed this particular term of “wirtschaftsfriedlich” within his ironic quotation marks, Hitler (1925) has employed a convention of language not only to mock National Socialism’s economic opponents, but to destabilize before readers the notion of peace through international, capitalist economy as well. This destabilization, insofar as it correlates, without discourse or normal argumentation, to the rejection by National Socialists of joint agents for capitalism and peace, shows readers a position that wishes to know no negotiation on the one hand, and works to cultivate rabid anti-capitalism alongside notions of eternal physical struggle on the other. This quotation itself internalizes National Socialist ideology. Hence, even if a reader does not agree with the express argument by Hitler against pursuit of peace through capitalist development, that same reader’s potential acceptance of Hitler’s quotation itself—an acceptance which will be nigh-certain in coming since the quotation ostensibly represents no more than mocking—constitutes

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6 “England saw in Germany the power whose trade – and thus political meaning…increased, so that one could already carry out a comparison between the two states in the same areas. The ‘financially peaceful’ conquest of the world, which to our state’s directors appeared to be the conclusion to a final wisdom, became for the English politician a reason for organization of resistance thereto.”
simultaneously an acceptance of internalized Nazi ideology. What here proves unique, then, is that Hitler produces in his reading audience, through language, an agreement with impulsive dismissal of international capitalist democracy. And it is this agreement that, howsoever covertly, will attach German readers to key components of National Socialist ideology.

As his language mirrors Hitler's in its employment of the “Welt”-prefix, so does Rosenberg, in his *Mythus des 20. Jahrhunderts* (1930), share with Hitler the technique of ironic quotation. Indeed, in exactly those moments of *Mythus’* argumentation at which Rosenberg (1930) must, because of lacking proof, forego factual citation, he turns to this device of language. Picking up a familiar theme, he lambastes the “Finanzwissenschaft” [financial science] and discredits the pursuit of “friedliche” [peaceful] economic attempts at international harmony (Rosenberg 1930, 123-520). The ultimate effect of such irony manifests in the philosopher’s dismissal of academic or intellectual culture, in the stead of which Rosenberg advocates a new, radically subjective type of thought:

Dass unsere Forscher bei der Gestaltengeschichte stehenbleiben, ohne selbst gestalten zu können, zeigt nur, dass ihr Gestaltungswille gebrochen ist…Der neue Mythus und die neue typenschaffende Kraft, die heute bei uns nach Ausdruck ringen, können überhaupt nicht ‘widerlegt’ werden. Sie werden sich Bahn brechen und Tatsachen schaffen (Rosenberg 1930, 700).

As in the earlier passage from Hitler (1925), neither an actual source nor documentation is provided by Rosenberg (1930) for his quotation of “widerlegt” [contradicted]. The quotation strikes German readers as a device meant to deride those who would refute the cause or work of National Socialist authors on the basis of logical shortcomings in the latter’s ideology. There emerges from the functioning of Rosenberg’s language, however, a far more significant manipulation of the same readers. With its ironic gesture Rosenberg’s quotation places in doubt not just the credibility of anti-Nazi academics; rather, it places in doubt the state of being contradicted – definitionally, the state of being refuted via a logical means and system. Thereby the quotation serves to de-stabilize the notion of logical thought, asserting instead an epistemology without that system’s otherwise standard (that is, for everyone other than National Socialists) confines, and in so doing internalizing a National Socialist ideology that would know no obstruction from the limits of supposed reason or of systematized thinking. Thus language again substantiates for contemporary German readers Rosenberg’s cause. For, insofar as these readers will accept the quotation as mere mocking even if they are skeptical of the argument it accompanies, theirs will be a simultaneous acceptance of the ideology that lies within that same quotation. Theirs will be a vicarious bond through language, in other words, to the National Socialist ideology. The logical system itself, and not merely the academics who espouse it, will meet with dismissal from Rosenberg and audience alike. And so Nazi authors, in what again confirms Klemperer (1946) and Seidel’s (1961) thesis, shall transcend an argumentative failure by employing language to enact ideology.

IV. Words Fanatical

As Klemperer (1946) notes, the word “Fanatismus” [fanaticism], though present in literature from Enlightenment onward, meets with especial manipulation by National Socialism. Initially, the word

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7 “That our researchers remain engaged with the history of figures without themselves being able to create, only shows that their creative will is broken…the new myth und the new type-creating power, which today wrestle for expression among us, cannot at all be ‘contradicted.’ They will pave roads for themselves and create facts.”
functions to a pejorative end: it appears in Nazi propaganda against those who support the church with abandon (Klemperer 1946, 77). When railing against clerical objection to war, for example, Goebbels and his fellows speak of Christian opposition as being under the spell of a “wirrkoepfigen Fanatismus” [crazy-headed fanaticism]; the propagandists meanwhile define “Fanatismus” as a state in which spiritual passion dictates totally one’s being (Klemperer 1946, 80). After “Fanatismus” accompanies such an argument of detriment, however, the word also comes to characterize individuals who devote themselves to Nazi efforts. It comes to characterize, positively, those Germans who would be “fanatisch kaempfende Truppen” [fanatically struggling troops] – who would serve as of the most “wilden Fanatismus” [wild fanaticism] (Klemperer 1946, 82).

If this second usage differs argumentatively from the pejorative one, yet it nevertheless does not occur without connoting religion. For, since Nazi authors have hitherto employed the word “Fanatismus” with an exclusively religious meaning, an associative link still exists, for readers, between that meaning and whatever the word proceeds to describe. Hence though the express content of Nazi propaganda rails initially against established non-secular organizations such as the Vatican, the authors’ diction itself – insofar as it subsequently employs, to describe the Nazi cause, a word, “Fanatismus,” which is previously defined and identified with religion alone--serves in the event to endow National Socialism with its own spiritual status. So does language attach to National Socialism, before readers, what the latter’s ideology would purport: holy or divine significance.

It is in this manner that the language of Hitler’s Mein Kampf (1925), through its strategic employment of “fanatisch” [fanatic], functions to enact for readers a crucial component of Nazi ideology; and to validate therewith Klemperer (1946) and Seidel’s (1961) thesis. When identifying devotees of Christianity as forming an organization with their own agenda and without the national German one, Hitler describes all religious opposition as of a “fanatische Unduldsamkeit” [fanatical impatience] that, in its frenzied state, pursues the destruction of other parties just as it would that of a heathen altar (Hitler 1925, 506). Its pejorative argument against churches aside, this description defines “fanatisch” as a spiritual condition – establishes the word “fanatisch” as corresponding specifically to a religious devotion and cause. Thus subsequent use of the word by Hitler during the following passage comes to connote for readers far more than bombast:

Dagegen waren die nationalsozialistischen Versammlungen allerdings keine ‘friedlichen’ Versammlungen…Da schlossen [sie] nicht mit dem faden Herunterleiern irgendeines patriotischen Liedes, sondern mit dem fanatischen Ausbruch voelkischer und nationaler Leidenschaft (Hitler 1925, 541).8

At first glance, Hitler does little here other than contend, ridiculously, that National Socialist song functions in a manner superior to that of German political opponents. Emerging from Hitler’s language of “fanatischen Ausbruch” [fanatical outbreak], though, is a far subtler working in which a component of National Socialist ideology occurs to German readers: a working, namely, in which the idea emerges that Nazis, in their being and in their passion for nationalism, operate as a religious organization. The emergence of this idea lies in the word “fanatisch” – in its connotations as earlier created by, and still present in, Hitler’s language itself. Having accompanied Hitler’s argument against Christian elements, “fanatisch” has been so employed as an adjective as to cement for readers a link between that which the adjective describes on the one hand, and things non-secular on the other. Therefore, even if the argument around which the word later appears concerns National

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8 “By comparison the national-socialist assemblies were certainly no ‘peaceful’ assemblies…there [they] ended not with any stale rattling-off of some patriotic song, but instead with the fanatical outbreak of folkish and national passion.”
Socialism as opposed to religious organizations – and even if the word’s appearance is within a positive rather than negative argumentative frame – the word nevertheless endows to its Nazi referent a religious meaning. Put differently, because the word “fanatisch” originally and hitherto exclusively accompanied discussion of churches, it still, when attached to National Socialism by Hitler, connotes spirituality and religion. Readers, earlier inundated with definitions of “Fanatismus” as a specifically spiritual condition, cannot but see what Hitler’s language describes – namely National Socialism – as religious. Thus, in an argument regarding the passion that makes National Socialist behavior unique, the word “fanatisch” transforms the outbreak of National Socialist faith – whether in the form of passion, action, or song – into an outbreak of holy significance.

In this manner, Hitler’s language affects that which the leader’s regular argumentation cannot. Once begun, this effect continues throughout Hitler’s subsequent usage of “fanatisch” to transfigure his supporters and cause. German devotion to leaders, described as of the “fanatischen Glaubens,” thus becomes a religious faith (Hitler 1925, 597). Moreover, stricter admission policies for the National Socialist party, described as protecting the party’s “fanatisches Ziel,” thus take on a holy aspect (Hitler 1925, 656). Most crucial, National Socialism, because “fanatisch,” occurs to readers as what its ideology would wish itself to be: a cause the significance, actions, and followers of which transcend the political to possess instead a divine, even eschatological correspondence. And so does Hitler’s language itself – in a new divine paradox, as it were – enact National Socialist ideology for readers. On a local scale, Klemper and Seidel’s thesis about the universal, ideology-enacting effect of Nazi language has again proven accurate.

In such manipulation of language, Rosenberg’s Mythus des 20. Jahrhunderts (1930) mirrors Hitler’s Mein Kampf (1925). First, Rosenberg establishes the words “fanatisch” or “Fanatismus,” in his invective against religious organizations, as exclusively religious in meaning. Devout followers of Roman Catholicism behave with an “unzähmbaren Fanatismus” [untamable fanaticism]; the soul of the “fanatischer” Islamic system asserts militarily its relation to the divine; and Christian opponents to National Socialism work as “fanatischen kirchlich-katholischen” [fanatical churchly-Catholic] operatives whose entire being is dictated, to its great detriment, by spiritual concerns (Rosenberg 1930, 74-468). Thereafter Rosenberg proceeds to employ these words, which have been given spiritual content or definition inasmuch as they have been attached by Rosenberg to religion alone, in his description of that Nietzschean, anti-Marxist model on which National Socialism aims to mould itself:


Throughout Mythus (1930), Rosenberg has sought, and due to lack of argumentative proof has largely failed, to substantiate National Socialism as a spiritual identity and center. Here, though, he succeeds on the strength of language. For, in his appropriation of Zarathustra as basis for the National Socialist cause, Rosenberg employs language to itself enact this component of Nazi ideology. Since his diction has previously linked the word “fanatisch” and its variants on one hand,

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9 “Through its madness of the masses (instruction according to quantity), Marxist sociology throttled all essence (quality) […] against this Friedrich Nietzsche presented the desperate scream of oppressed millions. His wild sermon of the Übeermensch was a violent enlargement of an individual life, curbed by the material pressure of the time-period, […] that in a moment of sudden rebellion destroyed all [decadent] values.”
and a religious mentality and status on the other, the word must bestow on its referent – regardless of context or argumentative frame – a spiritual connotation. Hence this connotation will elicit from readers a transfiguration of otherwise insidious, even commonplace Nazi activities: even with the best of intentions, a component of Nazi ideology – that is, its aspirations to divinity – will infiltrate readers’ thought. Through the connotative crucible of “fanatisch,” work for the National Socialist cause, howsoever bureaucratic or seedy, betrays a spiritual act; through this same crucible, those who attest National Socialism’s ultimate significance, howsoever inarticulate and lacking in proof, become like to preachers of gospel. And so German readers, even if or when viewing Rosenberg’s argument as flawed, will come in part to recognize National Socialism as its own religious organization. Here as in other cases, Nazi language itself will enact the party ideology – confirming thereby not only Klemperer’s sketched idea on “Fanatismus,” but the universal thesis he shares with Seidel as well.

V. Conclusion

With its attention to key passages from *Mythus des 20. Jahrhunderts* (1930) and *Mein Kampf* (1925), this article has shown that Rosenberg and Hitler, in their effort to attach German audiences to the Nazi ideology, succeed rather through language than through the weak argumentation and evidence they otherwise provide. The nature of this lingual success is such that even disinclined readers become convinced of certain among National Socialism’s ideological components. Indeed, whether in the form of the “Welt”-prefix, the ironic quotation, or the diction of “Fanatismus,” Hitler and Rosenberg author a manipulation that works surreptitiously so as to broker bonds to ideology through a reader’s local reception of language. Therein do both their works share techniques that enact the particular, as well as the universal trends of Nazi language as identified by Klemperer (1946) and Seidel (1961). That this correspondence occurs on a limited scale must of course be conceded. *Mythus* (1930) and *Mein Kampf* (1925), after all, offer but an early smattering of eventual Nazi language; and as critic Sauer (1973) would note, study of these texts can in no sense claim to encapsulate the lingual development which occurred under the Third Reich. But these criticisms are largely beside the point. A study seeking to examine exhaustively the cases and conditions in which Nazi language operated could not capture that which made the latter a monolith: for manipulation by this language, like that by the ideology the language conveyed, took place not in consistent or definitive movement. It took place rather in a method that infiltrated German values differently in moments and degree, but all the while to a common end. If one is to understand this method, and, further, to see that embodiment of it from which German audiences would comprehensively bond with National Socialism, one need look no further than in the texts of Rosenberg and Hitler.

References


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