Diego de Villegas y Quevedo, a canon priest from the cathedral of Cuzco, writes the following sonnet in honor of the newly named Viceroy Joseph Manso de Velasco, Conde de Superunda (1745-1761) in recognition of his role in the rebuilding of the fort of Callao, its port, and the city of Lima after the devastating earthquake of 1746. The poem reads:

De las Ondas el Cuerpo tumultuado
Al Callao anegó y arruinó a Lima;
Porque igneo Mongibelo el centro anima,
Que agua, y tierra movió desenfrenado.
Atán misero estrago duplicado
El Excelente MANSO el hombro arrima,
Sin que a su aliento, y su valor comprima
Uno, y otro elemento conjurado.
A Lima redifica, el mar enfrena;
Sobre sus ondas Ciudadela funda,
Bolviendo Muro la flexible Arena:
Y la REAL MAGESTAD Sabia, y profunda,
Quando su Zelo de Mercedes llena,
CONDE lo hace immoral de SUPER-UNDA.¹

Referring to the earthquake as a “cuerpo tumultuado,” Villegas points to the devastation that it caused to Callao as the tsunami submerged (“anegó”) its fort, port, and everything within proximity. Fire, water, and dirt consumed all. The author praised the work of Viceroy Superunda, namely the rebuilding of the walls that surrounded Callao since they served as a protection wall for not only Callao but the city of Lima as well. I would like to focus on what Villegas said about Callao.² My intention is not to center solely on the earthquake but rather how in times of crisis, including natural disasters, spaces are redefined for the sake of social and political order as was the case at this point in time in Peru. It is within this context that Villegas envisioned the reconstruction of the port of Callao and its fort as key vehicles for the achievement of social control.

In the eighteenth century, the word “puerto” was understood as “Lugar seguro y defendido de los vientos, donde pueden entrar los navíos con seguridad, y hallan asilo contra las tempestades” (Diccionario de autoridades 425). Metaphorically speaking, it also meant asylum, protection, and shelter. The word came from the Latin “portus, a portando” implying that through ports, goods and merchandise are brought to the mainland (Tesor de la lengua castellana 1381). When, in 1756, Viceroy of Peru José Antonio Manso de Velasco described the manner in which the 1746 earthquake destroyed the Port of Callao, he explained to the King that the inhabitants of Callao “estaban poseídos de gran temor, contemplándose sin defensa en tiempo de una Guerra en que el objeto principal de los enemigos era fatigar y destruir las ciudades marítimas de América” (Relación de gobierno 390). Natural disasters and pirate attacks upon the South American ports created uncertainty and fear at this time, although the ports proved essential for the economic stability and growth of the kingdom. Decades later, another Viceroy, Theodore de Croix (1784-1790), proclaimed the importance of all ports (but especially this same Port of Callao) as useful and beneficial tools for commerce. According to him, this port “ha hecho en todos tiempos y en diferentes Gobiernos de la mayor atención un objeto que interesa al Rey, al comercio y al bien público por la seguridad de la vida de los hombres y por el beneficio que todos reportan con la introducción y extracción de los frutos y efectos que se comercian activa y pasivamente” (151).

This essay examines the significance of the Port of Callao for the Spanish crown in the eighteenth century as a strategic place of government, as a geographical source of knowledge, as a useful place for economic progress, and as a social space of stability as well as fear. I analyze how this particular port is
rethought spatially within the politics of the Enlightenment. Following Charles Withers, this article emphasizes “the placed and mobile nature of the Enlightenment” and the manner in which ports were read, sketched, mapped and constructed as crucial devices of local and transoceanic management and knowledge (16). Furthermore, I propose to read this particular port as a material and metaphorical space which was open to cultural encounters, political agendas, and new ways of thinking. The primary texts to be discussed are the Relación de gobierno written in the eighteenth century by the Viceroy José Antonio Manso de Velasco as well as the accounts and visual illustrations of European travelers such as Jorge Juan (1713-1773), Antonio de Ulloa (1716-1795) and Amedée François Frézier (1682-1773), who as men of science envisioned this and other South American ports from the perspective of European expansionism and scientific knowledge. In sum, I would like to explore how fear also worked as a psychological tool to portray the port as strategic place of social control and political order. First, I will offer a brief synopsis on how the Port of Callao became so strategic a place for the Spanish Crown since their arrival in South America.

I. Ports and the Management of Space: The Case of Callao

On January 25, 1566, Alvaro de Torres, a member of the Municipal Council (cabildo) in Lima, called attention to the naming of a mayor for the main port that protected Lima as a means to facilitate social order and to control the number of vessels that entered and left the country. The Port of Callao, which had become the main point of entrance to the Viceroyalty of Peru, had turned into a busy place where people from different ethnic, social, and racial groups interacted on a daily basis. According to Alvaro de Torres, as paraphrased by Bernabé Cobo, the figure of the mayor was crucial in the attempts to maintain social order in the port city: “para que los hombres de mar vivan bien y no hagan daño de perjuicio á los naturales ni otras personas que están y residen el dicho Puerto y que a los negros que andan con las carretas y barcos y otras granjerías estén recogidos y no hagan hurtos y no se atrevan a ir y a entrar en los ranchos de los indios sin licencia, ni les tomen sus haciendas” (cited in Melo 5).

For political authorities in colonial Peru, the port of Callao constituted a door to economic progress and maritime protection. For many of the transient individuals who worked there, the port signified a type of contact zone, or as Mary Louise Pratt explains, the space of colonial encounters “in which peoples geographically and historically separated come into contact with each other and establish ongoing relations, usually involving conditions of coercion, radical inequality, and intractable conflict” (6). From the inception of the port of Callao, fear of potential disorder stemming from individuals of African descent or foreigners intermingling in spaces reserved for Spaniards – or in this case, Indians – had caused uncertainty for the Spanish authorities. For geographical reasons, this crossing of boundaries became difficult to stop, and a governmental figure proved to be essential to instill order there.

Since the sixteenth century, the Port of Callao had developed into the main port of entrance to South America. According to Antonio de Alcedo in Diccionario geográfico de las Indias Occidentales o América (1786-89), Callao had become a city in 1671 and had been attacked years earlier by “the English pirate” Jacob Heremite Clerk, who, although blocking the port for five months, was unable to besiege it (204). Alcedo mistakenly identified Clerk as English when in fact Jacques de Clerk, also known as Jacques L’Hermite, was a Dutch merchant turned privateer. Alcedo did not mention that a Dutch pirate, Joris van Spilbergen, also attacked the city prior to Clerk. Domenico Coletti, in his Diccionario Histórico-Geográfico published in 1771, made reference to Spilbergen’s attack of Callao in 1615. With a fleet of approximately 700 to 1600 people, Spilbergen burned and raided the Spanish fleets before he proceeded to sail north to Payta. In his journal New East and West Indian Navigation (1619), Spilbergen describes the Spaniards’ fear of the attack: “This, indeed, reduced them to such a state that the crew of the one sought safety on board of the other, and a large number of the Vice-Admiral’s men sprang into the Admiral’s ship, fearing that their own, being quite riddled, would soon go down” (74) [see
Figure 1. The illustration shows the vulnerability of the port city, which at that time had neither a fort nor walls to protect it. This battle was also described by Catalina de Erauso in her *Vida i sucesos de la Monja Alferez*. She became one of Spilbergen’s prisoners and in her memoir she underscored Callao’s vulnerability to future attacks. Meanwhile, its proximity to Lima (about nine miles) also made it a threat to the capital city. What was considered “the golden age of piracy” would determine the many reconstructions that Callao, as a physical place, would undergo in the eighteenth century (Lane 6). To manage the risks of future attacks, the Spanish authorities implemented a series of reforms that included, among other things, the strengthening of their navy and the reconfiguration of its ports as military posts.

Kris E. Lane explains that, in the late sixteenth century, “the rise of buccaneers coincided with the decline of Spain, first as the preeminent political player in Europe and the Mediterranean, then as an economic superpower” (96). This decline, Lane adds, “meant that Spain’s American colonies were weaker both as consumer markets and as suppliers of hard money” (96). The Seven Years’ War (1754-1763) against England rendered the Spanish coasts primary targets of attack as England aimed to conduct its attacks from the sea. The Bourbon reforms would try to counteract many of these problems through the centralization of power and the improvement of their military defenses. This “process of modernization,” as John R. Fisher calls it, would transform the South American ports into privileged spaces of knowledge and power (61).

One of the Bourbon reforms’ major repercussions for Peru’s economic situation was the establishment of the Viceroyalty of La Plata in 1776. As Ann Twinam explains, the creation of this viceroyalty “deprived Upper Peru of jurisdictions, of captive markets, and of the silver mine of Potosí, with the result that its fortunes sank” (313). One major consequence for Peru was the loss of Upper Peru to the newly created viceroyalty. The “free trade” treaty, known as “Reglamentos de Aranceles Reales para el Comercio Libre de España e Indias” (1778), would impact Peru’s economic situation on other levels. For example, the once-authorized Port of Callao lost its primordial monopoly position in South America, which subsequently prompted it to compete with other port cities, making the reorganization of the trade route a point of contention between the urban elite in Lima and the colonial authorities (Mazzeo 133). The Port of Buenos Aires, newly named by colonial authorities as an official port, saturated the Peruvian market with material goods that lowered prices to the
extent that Peruvian merchants could no longer turn respectable profits. Merchants in Lima seemed to be the major critics of this situation, as they argued that the opening of other Pacific ports such as Arica, Concepción, Guayaquil, and Valparaíso decreased Lima’s trade through Callao by a third of what it was prior to 1778 (Fisher 61).

As a result of free trade, new forms of commercial expansion clearly brought great changes to the manner in which Peruvians as well as colonial authorities envisioned their role in the management and circulation of natural and material resources. How did all these historical events and reforms transform the Port of Callao in the second half of the century as a physical entity intrinsically embedded in the politics of the State? How was the port rethought during all these years and from what locus of enunciation? Finally, how did natural disasters such as the 1746 earthquake and tsunami that devastated the Port of Callao affect the new conception of the port as a military place? These questions are key to our understanding of ports as crucial devices of local and transoceanic forms of management and knowledge in the Age of Enlightenment.

II. Re-envisioning Callao in the Age of Enlightenment: Natural Disasters, Piracy, and Contraband

Descriptions of the Port of Callao were abundant throughout the eighteenth century. From natural histories, to traveling accounts, to geographical dictionaries, the main port of South America until 1776 was a point of discussion in matters of politics and commerce. In Relación del viaje por el Mar del Sur (1714), the French engineer and mathematician Amédée François Frézier was hired by the Spanish government in 1711 to examine the coasts of South America (“Mar del Sur”) in order to draw up plans for the fortified towns, with aims to improve their protection and end the rampant contraband taking place in many of the coastal cities. Frézier described the bay of Callao where the port is located as “la más Hermosa y la más segura de todo el Mar del Sur…El mar está siempre tan tranquilo que los navíos carenan allí en cualquier época sin temor a ser sorprendidos por una ráfaga de viento” (172). Frézier instructed the reader to consult “Figure XXVI,” which was included in his relación to help better understand what he was trying to explain [see Figure 2, “Plan de la Rada de Callao”]. In these plans, we can observe the openness of the port and how topography itself would block winds allowing a calmer sea. Quite contrary to Spilbergen’s account, where images of danger and crowdedness surround the port [see Figure 1], Frézier focuses on the hydrographic nature of the port by presenting an almost empty coastal space with very few buildings, and no sign of human population. A little building is included as representative of the city, but what he really wished to emphasize was the accessibility of the port and the fact that “[e]n el puerto de Callao se encuentra todo lo necesario para la navegación” (172). The maritime tools located on the left side of the plans emphasized their commercial value.
Frézier included more detailed plans when describing the city of Callao; plans which he could not see independent of the port. In these plans [see Figure 3, “Plan de la Ville du Callao”], drafted in 1713, Frézier offered a topographic view of the port and its surroundings which focused primarily on its militaristic value. At the top left we find artifacts such as ammunitions, barrels, and cannon balls, which attest to the fact that the city was armed and shielded. At the top of the plans, we have images of bastions and fortified curtains (“courtine”), underscoring the notion that the port was protected against enemies. A close-up of the city points to important aspects of its profile: The number of churches indicated by letters, the administrative building (letter K), and the thirteen bastions that physically circumscribed the town; all carried names of saints. Across the bay we can see, below the phrase “the survey or view of Callao,” a number of ships that form almost an additional wall protecting the port and city. The military value of the port in protecting the city is clearly illustrated in the way Frézier designed the plans.
In terms of the description that he included in the account, emphasis was also placed on the militaristic nature of the port city. According to Frézier, the city was first fortified under the reign of Philip IV with a wall surrounded by ten bastions. However, he points out that by 1713, the fort was in state of disrepair as the materials that had been used to build it (adobe, sand, and lime) were not strong enough to withstand the weather and the strength of the tides that constantly bombarded the shores. Totally absent from the plans are images of the people who lived in the city port or worked there; for example, the indigenous people who belonged to the militia, or the mulattos and free blacks who worked as carpenters and caulkers. Frézier did mention them in his *Relación*, while also indicating that the city was lacking in soldiers who could protect it: “apenas hay soldados para montar guardia en la plaza de armas” (179). Furthermore, he criticized the fact that, despite certain funds allocated by the King to spend on military fortifications, “el mantenimiento de las murallas del Callao, del lado del mar se los deja convertir en ruinas, de modo que será necesario reconstruir casi la mitad de las mismas” (180). Frézier’s plans do highlight the nature of his task as dictated by the King, as the city was visually conceived only in terms of its materiality – as a fortified space and a viable port. What was lacking in the city was the human element that could bring reason and order (economically and militarily) to this strategic space. Unfortunately, according to him, the port that once had “todo lo necesario para la navegación” was now on the verge of succumbing: “no va a durar mucho tiempo pues el mar lo derriba de día en día” (172).

Decades later, in their *Relación histórica del viaje a la América Meridional* (1748), Antonio de Ulloa and Jorge Juan offered a slightly different view of Callao. Ulloa and Juan were part of a scientific expedition organized by the French Academy of Sciences to study with precision not only the shape of the earth but also to measure the longitudinal meridian at the Equator. The expedition was authorized by Philip V in 1735, and went under the leadership of French geographer and mathematician Charles Marie de la Condamine. Ulloa and Juan also specified in their *Relación* that the objective of their scientific enterprise was to “poner en la mas posible defensa aquellas Costas, y Reyno, para que en caso que las Esquadras de Inglaterra, con cuya Corona se acababa de romper la Guerra, como queda dicho, hiciesen en ellas alguna tentativa, hallasen en la resistencia que no podia discurrir, su repulsa, y tal vez escarmiento” (Volume 3, Book II, Chapter I, 250). As the quote points out, their view of the coastal territories was greatly influenced by the fact that they were observing them as spaces which were under constant maritime threat. The means with which to combat fear also underlines their respective views of that space. Indeed, piracy was still forcing colonial authorities to reevaluate the spatial configuration of many South American ports, namely Callao.

The Port of Callao was also forced to contend with nature itself. According to both authors, the ocean that surrounded the port of Callao had been named incorrectly since the Pacific Ocean, as the ocean that ranged from Callao to Panama, was not as pacific as its name suggested due to the “Temporales bien furiosos y Mares tan alborotados” (Volume III, Book II, Chapter III, 276). They further complained about the journey from the coastal town of Payta to Callao, as it took longer than it should have because along this route, “corren las Aguas con violencia para el Norte y Noroeste” (Volume III, Book II, Chapter I, 253). In the index of notable places and items discussed in their *relación* and included in Volume II, they also mentioned how “the great earthquake” [el gran terremoto] of 1746 totally destroyed the port due to the resulting tsunami.

Despite the danger involved in sailing around Callao, they did stress the importance of the port as a main commercial post, since most of the commercial routes from the viceroyalty to the rest of South America had to navigate those waters. The map of “El Puerto de Callao” that they included, with its adjacent buildings, does not seem to emphasize the port and town of Callao as a well-defended place, despite being based in part on Frézier’s hydrographic plans [see Figure 4, “Puerto de Callao”]. The legend that accompanies the map, or what they called “mapa de planos,” shows how their visual rendition of the port focused mainly on adjacent
ports, the proximity to Lima [see letter H], small surrounding towns, coastal points, and islands. The only military object depicted was the Fort of Callao [letter Y]. The lack of objects and architectural details on the map forces the viewer to focus on the accessibility of the geographical areas being portrayed. The ocean is occupied by words and numbers, making it appear smaller in comparison to the Port of Callao, which seems comparatively more immense than the ocean surrounding it. The map pays more attention to the land around it than to the coast itself. To this extent, as Christian Jacob explains,

A map is not a mimetic image, but an analogical image, the product of an abstraction that interprets the landscape and makes it intelligible by translating the profusion of what can be observed into a dynamic order of contiguities and relationships. A map thus constantly requires choices, exclusions, movements, and equivalences inside classes of permutable objects. (23)

By paying more attention to the inland than to the coast, the Spanish authors underlined what they considered the ultimate threat: The danger that the inland, including Lima, was at the risk of being attacked or infiltrated by foreigners.

Figure 4. Jorge Juan and Antonio de Ulloa. Port of Callao. Relación histórica de un viaje por la América Meridional. (1748). German edition. Physikalische und historische Nachrichten vom südlichen und nordöstlichen America. 1781. Courtesy of The Rare Book & Manuscript Library of the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.

It is in Noticias secretas de América, a secret report written in 1748 addressed to the King, where the authors offered a more candid view of the port.15 The secret report aimed to offer a discussion of the state of corruption rampant in the colonial territories as well as to describe the naval, military, and political state of the colonies. With regard to Callao, Ulloa and Juan presented a more detailed description of the port as a contact zone. They explained that it was considered “the principal port of the Kingdom of Peru” because it served as the headquarters of the Spanish army as well as the main port of commercial exchange between Spain and South America (23). They also explained that, due to its accessibility, it was always subject to foreign attacks. The compromised state of its infrastructure made the port an easy target. They criticized the lack of military presence to the extent that, according to them, it would have been rather simple for enemies to assault Lima via any of the zones adjacent to the port. They added that Callao was not only important because of its commercial status, but also because of its immediacy to the center of government: “inmediato al lugar de residencia del Virrey y capital del Imperio” (89). It was in all these terms that the government needed to rethink the strategic and spatial configuration of the port. As they reiterated, “[n]o hay duda en que si algunos piratas ó corsarios de
fuerzas considerables hubieran entrado al Mar del Sur, como lo ha sucedido en varias ocasiones, no tendría absolutamente como defenderse” (139-40).

The secret report painted a picture of Callao that the map in the Relaciones was unable to capture: A sense of noticeable chaos and corruption. For instance, there lacked an administrative presence in the arsenal, ammunition was lost, and contraband was rampant. The transient population that worked and intersected there also seemed to contribute to this chaos. Ulloa and Juan illustrated how the vessels (as spaces of contact) embodied the diverse racial population characteristic of the capital of the Kingdom. They were astounded as to how people from different races and social strata seemed to converge there in a chaotic mix: “y así no es extraño ver a bordo en un mismo navío un sargento marino criollo, un contramaestre Indio, un guardián mestizo, un carpintero mulato, ó un calafatero negro. Los cirujanos, sangraderas ó barberos son casi todos de Lima mulatos obscuros, y de ellos se suple la armada real y navíos mercantes” (101). According to the authors, the Port of Callao had become a space in which racial and social boundaries had been symbolically erased and ignored by those who worked there. For the Spaniards coming from Spain, this was intolerable, as we can see in the comment regarding what occurred when Spanish surgeons arrived at the port of Callao: “cuando llegan Españoles cirujanos de España y ven a los negros, no quieren trabajar con ellos” (101). The fact that some of these “negros bozales” knew how to do everything well because of their “agilidad y capacidad” made it very difficult for those in charge of the vessels to not hire them (101). The fear of that micro-space becoming too dark forced authorities to hire more Spanish, indigenous, and mulatto men to work in the port.

What seemed more worrisome was the fact that these social groups had learned to take advantage of the system. The authors mentioned how painters, silversmiths, shoemakers, and tailors came from Lima to work temporarily at the port within the artillery or as marines, with the sole objective of enjoying the “fuero militar y liberarse por este medio de los aguaciles de justicia” (141). This transient population contributed to the destabilization of order in the spatial configuration of the port, as they would pretend to be full members of the army, appearing only when representatives of the government came to check the state of the militia. However, they were also subject to abuses by the lieutenants in charge of the vessels, who took part of their salary in return for not exposing their lies. This and other types of corruption were so rampant that, according to Ulloa and Juan, “se practica en ellos con tanta libertad y desahogo, como si fuera un artículo de Ordenanzas Militares” (142). The authors also added that “es tan cundido el vicio entre los que mandan y los que debían impedirlo, que con dificultad, se podría reformar, sin tomar providencias tan activas” (143).

Ulloa and Juan called for total reform for the inhabitants who worked there and the space they occupied. The port and everything associated with it, including its fort, dock, city, the colonial authorities, and the transient population, all needed to be reassessed in order to make them into useful and productive citizens and spaces. Better knowledge of construction materials that could endure natural circumstances such as erosion and high tides was crucial to begin such a process. According to the authors, this was the state of Callao until 1746, when the horrendous earthquake and tsunami submerged the town. This would mark a new beginning for Callao in which the port and town would be rethought within the parameters of the Bourbon reforms and the tenets of the Enlightenment.

The memoirs written by Viceroy Manso de Velasco offer an in-depth look at how the port had to be reinvented. Illustrations included in his report also offer a visual idea of how the port and the city had to be rethought within the popular Bourbon objective of improving the imperial defenses “for the fulfillment of the primary aim of making the empire more secure against the threat of foreign intrusion” (Fisher 54). Pirates, especially British pirates, still represented a menace as Britain would become the greatest enemy of the Spanish crown, pursuing imperial interests in and throughout the sea. The geopolitical impact of the sea during this time of commercial and imperial expansion should not be underestimated. As Mario Hernández Sánchez-Barba suggests, at this point in time the sea constituted a key instrument of social progress (12). Nevertheless, oceans had become dangerous contact zones that kept Spanish authorities on the verge of fear. The earthquake of 1746 deepened this sense of fear within the entire population, but especially the colonial authorities.
The Viceroy of Peru José Antonio Manso de Velasco, in his *Relación de Gobierno de Perú, 1745-1761*, mentioned how from the beginning of his tenure he had to contend with the repercussions of the war between Spain and Britain and how this affected the state of the ports in South America. In particular, he mentioned the amount of money he had to spend to fortify the Port of Callao: “y el cuidado de tener el Puerto de Callao en estado de resistir cualquiera invasión” (167). To make matters worse, he revealed how the 1746 earthquake, or what referred to as the “infausto suceso,” and its subsequent tsunami submerged port and city to the point of disappearance. The destruction and astounding death toll symbolized “un aumento de dolor y una turbación del entendimiento tal” (260). The devastation of Callao represented a crisis for many but an opportunity for some. As authorities were trying to assess the losses, the Viceroy added, Indians and other casta groups would come to the coast to steal any commercial goods or food they could find. What had previously existed as the center of commercial exchange and military defense was now a land and sea full of human and material debris. Manso de Velasco comments: “los cuerpos de los que perecieron en esta desgracia inundaron la costa y me dio especial compasión considerándolos pastos las aves” (262). Those who did survive were reduced to walking through the debris begging for food.

The Viceroy had no choice but to immediately assemble a plan to reopen the port for two main reasons: On one hand, he had to address the shortage of food; on the other, he still had to contend with rumors that British pirates were planning to attack the port. He needed to reopen commerce and control enemy threats by rebuilding the fort. This rebuilding would take place under an atmosphere of great fear, even approaching panic, as Manso de Velasco commented: “[e]l cuidado con que todos estaban hacía que les pareciesen navíos las nubes en el mar, y se me comunicaban con frecuencia noticias que, no siendo despreciables, me hacían dedicar a prevenir los sucesos” (385). The coast of Callao was under constant threat, not only from natural disasters but also from military attacks. Only the rebuilding of the fort would calm the fears evoked by this situation and the “consternación en que se hallaba el pueblo” (387). Indeed, as Charles F. Walker argues, the 1746 earthquake did represent “a dangerous disruption of colonial order” (84).

Manso de Velasco decided to build a new fortress and asked the French engineer and mathematician Louis Godin to sketch the plans. Manso states that Godin, by following “las últimas reglas de lo moderno, delineó un pentágono que domina la bahía” (388). According to the most up-to-date engineering knowledge, the modernization of the port began on January 16, 1747. First in the process was to eliminate the many religious buildings (churches and convents) that existed previously “que embarazaban y eran obstáculo a las disciplina militar,” and to replace them with buildings intended primarily for defense purposes (388). The fortress, along with the wall, the ammunition warehouse, bastions, the artillery store, and naval warehouses all reflected the heavily militaristic view of the port. The buildings also acquired new names, especially the fortress, which was renamed Real Felipe del Callao. The emphasis on royal power, as evidenced by the new name, converged with the aim to improve military defenses emphasizing the urge to centralize governmental and spatial order that was so characteristic of the Bourbon reforms. Modernizing the port of Callao implied a study and mapping of the port and city in order to acquire useful language that could produce a new architecture of the port. The value of the port as space would determine its future structure.

Charles Withers explains that “Enlightenment mapmaking emphasized empirical observation and quantifiable measurement” (106). The plans that Manso de Velasco included as part of his *Relación de gobierno* represent a good example of this process as he visually delineated how the modern Port of Callao was to appear. We must also remember that the plans were based on the twelve plans that Louis Godin had drafted of the new fortress as well as its adjacent areas. Figure 5, “Map of Callao,” shows the new pentagonal shape of the new fortress which was now located farther away from the coast. The pentagon shape reflected a well-ordered space with each corner of the pentagon facing and defending a different angle of the port. Some were poised to defend the coastal areas while others the mainland. This rationalization of space, according to Manso de Velasco, was needed in order to “[p]recaber todos los ymcombenientes que nos amenazan hallándose indefenso
el Puerto del Callao” (“Informe” 234). According to him, this specific form was intended to “flanquear esta parte con mayor número de fuegos como manifiesta la figura pues de ningun modo se puede evitar el ser Batidos de los enemigos pero se dificulta mas el que los puedan tomar en esta forma” (236).

Even more important was the fact that this multi-sided fortress would help to decrease the potential for enemies to try and disembark inland, as had happened with the old fort, especially on the northwest side of the city. In one of the twelve plans included as part of his “Informe” to the King, he explained in detail the purpose of every angle. The plans, which had erased any sign of human presence, gave an interpretation of Callao as a highly organized and governed military post, in which space for military purposes had been maximized. The objective of the plans was to persuade and convince the King that the port of Callao was better protected than ever before. In this sense, the map fulfilled one of the goals of topographical maps and plans: That of defense and “strategic significance” (Harley 39).

The 1746 earthquake forced the colonial authorities to create a new Callao. Port and city needed to be rebuilt as more than ninety percent of the population had died and the infrastructure had collapsed. On the ruins of Callao’s square, a new town was erected – a town that, as D. Ventura Xímenez, a representative of the Junta de Real Hacienda in Lima, stated in 1746, was to represent the “antemural y respeto de esta Capital [Lima]” (213). The fortress was also supposed to defend the port from foreign enemies who were always trying to reach the South American coasts.

What also needed to be defended was the mercantilist nature of the port. For that reason, a new town named Bellavista was built on the ruins of Callao. It was meant to be mainly a commercial town designed for merchants and the establishment of warehouses. The authorities had also hoped that the colonial administrators in charge of governing the new town, port, and fortress would make Bellavista their permanent living residence. Bellavista (or “beautiful view”) was supposed to erase the chaos of the past. Everything related to commerce was intended to be circumscribed there. In sum, after the earthquake, what remained was a compartmentalized space which tried to transform the old Callao into a more centralized town. What was paramount was to eliminate the chaos that was once rampant in the port, as Ulloa and Juan had described it, and to replace it with a sense of order. Ironically, as Walker explains, “people rebuilt in the old area next to the beach” making it
impossible to erase the image of the old Callao as a hybrid contact zone (102). In the official documents of Manso de Velasco, human interactions between diverse racial groups that had previously taken place in the port had to disappear in order to be replaced by a physical sense of space in which cannons, walls, administrative buildings, and the fortress would create a more controlled contact zone.

**Concluding Remarks**

This discussion has shown how ports constituted crucial devices of local and transoceanic forms of management and knowledge. The example of the port of Callao offers a glimpse into how the port was spatially articulated for political, commercial, and military purposes. However, as Frézier, Jorge Juan and Antonio de Ulloa revealed, the port of Callao also represented an active space where people of different races and social backgrounds converged, making the space a fluid one. In this sense, the port as a contact zone was also conceived as a dangerous zone in need of control. The circulation of people and commodities added to the Port of Callao’s ever-changing nature, creating a complex space of commercial and cultural interactions. In the case of Callao, the port could not be seen as detached from the city and vice versa: They were both places of social interaction and identification.

Franklin W. Knight and Peggy K. Liss argue that “ports constituted the core of intellectual as well as material life” as ideas generally travelled with merchant and goods (7-8). To this statement we must add that ideas were also imposed upon the ports in order to properly manage their space. The geography of the port, as reflected in the plans and maps cited in this study, shows how people’s own ideas and political agendas influenced the manner in which the port of Callao was seen in the eighteenth century. The visual representations of Callao, which were deeply rooted in the practices of the Enlightenment such as “observing, mapping, collecting, comparing, writing, sketching, classifying, reading,” transformed the Port of Callao into a material space endowed with great military value (Withers 12).

The accounts of Antonio de Ulloa, Jorge Juan, and the Viceroy Manso de Velasco underscore the idea that, in order for the port of Callao to be a successful commercial post, it first needed to be a space of military defense. Maps and plans functioned as forms of knowledge – albeit knowledge produced for the well-being of the Spanish state and the local colonial government. The 1746 earthquake forced Manso de Velasco (out of fear and necessity) to produce a new port city defined by its fortress and its centralized form of government. Port and city were reinvented and transformed into a new defensive and administrative space with the aims of achieving military protection, social control, and government surveillance. Callao as a space of reason and order was reestablished, and the idea of Callao as a modern port and a defensive city emerged. When the newly created town of Bellavista replaced the community of Callao as a place to live, part of Callao was therefore erased. However, the memory of the “Callao antiguo” will endure in the minds of those who were unable to forget how enemy attacks, natural disasters, and commercial and social chaos were and will always be a constant threat.19

**Works Cited**


Croix, Theodore de. Memoria de los virreyes que han gobernado el Perú durante el tiempo del coloniaje español. Vol. 5. Lima: Librería Central de Felipe Bailly, 1859.


Notas

1 The poem has been reproduced in the volume dedicated to *Relación de Gobierno del Perú (1745-1761)* by Conde de Superunda and edited by Alfredo Moreno (151). I follow the original orthography of the document. The complete title of the poem is “En justa celebracion del merecido titulo del Conde de Super-Unda, que N Rey, y Sr. D. FERNANDO EL VI (que Dios guarde) concedió al Exmo. Señor d. JOSEPH MANSO Y VELASCO, Virrey de estos Reynos, y por la reparacion del Presidio, y Puerto del Callao, y el edificio de la Ciudad de Lima” (151).

2 I will not discuss the effect of the earthquake on Lima, as Charles F. Walker has written extensively about the impact of the earthquake on the capital in his most recent book *Shaky Colonialism* (2008).

3 This essay is part of a larger book-length project entitled *The Cultural Geography of Spanish American Ports in the Age of the Enlightenment* which I am currently writing. Geographically, the book will center on four important areas: Mexico, the Caribbean, the South American ports located in the Pacific Ocean, and the South American ports located in the South Atlantic. When examining these ports, an important aspect I address is how the economic boom that some ports enjoyed and the financial crisis that others suffered played a role in the discursive construction of these ports as political, cultural, and economic places of social interaction.

4 L’Hermite was commissioned by Prince Maurice of Nassau, which is what made him a privateer. After the block of Callao and its eventual unsuccessful control of the port, L’Hermite died of dysentery and was buried adjacent to the coast of Callao on the Island of San Lorenzo.

5 Spilbergen was a Dutch naval officer turned pirate. He was born in 1568 and died in 1620. For more information on the Dutch pirates or privateers and their attacks on Spanish territories, see Kris E. Lane’s *Pilaging the Empire: Piracy in the Americas, 1500-1750*, Chapter 3.

6 Spilbergen offered one of the first views of South American ports to European readers. His book was reproduced in Theodor De Bry’s *Great Voyages* and his plates were also copied by other publishers who published best-selling books about piracy (Kagan 81).

7 According to Catalina Erauso, Spilbergen was accompanied by eight fleets while Callao was being defended with five (96). See Chapter XVII, entitled “Pasa a Lima, De allí sale contra los holandeses. Piérdese y acógese a su armada. Échanle a la costa de Paita, y desde allí vuelve a Lima.”

8 The Seven Years’ War involved many European powers at the time, such as Britain, Portugal, and Prussia, against France, Austria, Russia, Sweden, Saxony, and Spain. In the case of Spain, it evolved into a series of hostilities against Britain that ended in the capture of Havana by the British army. The Treaty of Paris ended the conflict and although Spain recaptured Havana and Manila, it lost Florida. For more information, see Burkholder and Johnson, page 271.

9 The treaty required Spanish American colonies to import more products from Spain while also increasing their export of raw materials (Mazzeo 128).

10 Fisher argues that Callao still constituted an important commercial point, especially when it came to silver exports. However, it now had to compete with other ports such as Buenos Aires and Montevideo that could now supply cheaper European goods to the southern provinces of Peru (62).


12 The French word “bouclier” next to the military artifacts emphasizes that these items refer to shielding, defense, and protection.

13 For more on this expedition, see Pratt, pages 16-23.

14 All quotes follow the orthography of the original.

15 The complete title is *Noticias secretas de América, sobre el estado naval, militar, y político de los reynos del Perú y provincias de Quito, costas de Nueva Granada y Chile: gobierno y régimen particular de los pueblos de indios: cruel opresión y extorsiones de sus corregidores y curas: abusos...*
escandalosos introducidos entre estos habitantes por los misioneros: causas de su origen y motivos de su continuación por el espacio de tres siglos. It was published for the first time in London by David Barry in 1826.

16 Other earthquakes that affected Callao, but to lesser extent, occurred in the following years: 1586, 1609, 1655, 1687, 1713, and 1727. The 1609 earthquake caused great floods and the one in 1687 ruined the wheat crops (Melo 75-76).

17 He is referring to the squadrons led by Barnett in 1745 and of Lectok in 1747. None of them made it to Callao.

18 The “Informes” by Viceroy Manso de Velasco have been published by Darío Arrús in El Callao en época del coloniaje antes y después de la catástrofe de 1746, under the chapter entitled “Fundación del Castillo Real Felipe en 1747,” pages 207-50.

19 Manso de Velasco referred to Callao after the 1746 earthquake as “Callao antiguo” (269).